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In Australia engineers can be found accountable in common law,
under statute in certain contexts and in some jurisdictions they
can be found liable for professional misconduct. This paper
will focus upon the emerging liability trends and the increased
risk paradigm that has emerged in discretion based building control
system.
Common Law Liability
Law suits are not necessarily about rights and wrongs, they are
everything about the seeking of recompense from whoever is in the
litigation feeding chain for moneys lost on projects or injuries
sustained. Australia is a proportionate liability
environment. This doctrine provides that any defendant who
potentially has accountability or a responsibility for a loss will,
if found liable have to account in financial terms for that
adjudicated level of responsibility.
Because a number of actors in the construction and
engineering dynamic are uninsured, plaintiffs are very vigilant in
ensuring that they “rope in” any party that is potentially
liable. Insured professionals are very attractive because of
the “deep pocket” of the insurer standing behind the
engineer. Some jurisdictions like Victoria and the NT make it
compulsory as a prerequisite to registration to be insured. Most
other Australian jurisdictions do not require building
practitioners to be insured regardless of whether they are
engineers, commercial builders, draftsmen of quantity
surveyors. Building surveyors and residential builders are
nevertheless required to be insured in the majority of
jurisdictions. Majority is the apposite term because in
Tasmania and the ACT, residential builders do not have to carry
insurance cover.
A fire engineer needs to be aware of which construction actors
are required by law to be insured visa vie those that are not
because it impacts upon the risk matrix. Uninsured actors
harbour less appeal than insured actors for plaintiffs as litigants
are always intent on seeking out the deep pockets.
“Claims against an engineer may occur even if he did nothing
wrong. This is because if there are large losses, all
potentially responsible parties may be sued with a goal of letting
the courts determine who is at fault. Design professionals
get named because they were at the scene of the crime…… the legal
obligation of any engineer is to perform in accordance with the
generally accepted professional standard of care. And in
cases that allow the economic loss rule, the only party that can
sue an engineer is the engineer`s client. (Fire Protection
Engineering – Potential Pitfalls with Professional Liability
Insurance by Mark Blankenship, magazine published by the Society of
Fire Protection Engineers USA).
Note that Blankenship states correctly that an engineer may be
sued even if s/he or it did nothing wrong. This is correct, a
lot of litigations are speculative and sometimes defendants are
joined and sued as part of a fishing exercise, to see what
emerges. There is also a view held by some that where there
is an insured defendant, if the insurer considers that there is any
risk, albeit remote, then it is “worth a crack” to get what is
called a nuisance value pay out.
Litigation is very much a game, a nasty game that is, and it is
not for the light of heart. We had one geotechnical
engineering company that was on the receiving end of 3 separate
claims, for three separate apartments in a block of town
houses. They had in our view no case to answer, but being a
small company; they could not afford to fund the defence of three
different claims for 2 years or thereabouts, even though at the
“end of the day” we were very confident of their total
exoneration. They thus made a decision to wind the company
up, such was their fear that the sheer cost of defending the matter
would inevitably lead to the insolvency of the company. You
see engineers and contractors are not in the business or industry
of litigation. Insurers are professional litigators;
litigation is part of their raison d’etre.
“The standard of care owed by professionals is determined by
what can reasonably be expected by professionals professing the
professional skill, taking into account all the relevant
circumstances of the time - that is appropriate professional
performance in that particular situation………………if a particular
profession does not have a generally applicable and widely shared
view of professional practice, the professionals duty and standard
of care is defined by default by the view of performance formed by
the court in retrospect, in the course of the particular litigation
proceeding………..So there remains a very significant “missing
link” for the engineering profession and industry : there is no
standard of professional performance in engineering that is ‘widely
accepted in Australia by professional peer opinion”.[1]
Tests in this arena are fluid, imprecise and in the area of fire
engineering particularly so. This is because there is so much
fire engineering modelling. This type of modelling
particularly in the fire dynamic requires calculated hypothesis,
intelligent and informed speculation and the ability to “have a go”
at predicting fire behaviour. One thing that the Victorian
bushfire experience taught us all was that one can so easily
underestimate the brutality and awesomely destructive forces of
what can be at times a malevolent force of nature. Some would
say that the previous “rule book” on fire controls and the
understanding of the fire dynamic had to be thrown out.
A prominent fire engineer once told me that he considered fire
engineering to be a “dark art”, a relatively new and evolving
discipline in its own right. If his observations “hold water”
then it would be considered to be an evolving science and
accompanying that will be the metamorphosis of legal liability in
so far as it relates to fire engineering.
I have quoted a very insightful and poignant extract published
by The Warren Centre titled “Professional Performance Innovation
and Risk in Australian Engineering Practise”. Although it
does not appear to have been written by lawyers it nevertheless
captures the disquiet, disillusionment and nervousness of members
of the engineering profession with respect to the modern day
litigation malaise that if anything is gaining momentum.
“It seems not uncommon for engineering professionals to view
with scepticism – if not disdain - what takes place when
engineering liability issues are the subject of litigation, and the
excessive time and costs involved for all parties…………..[there has
been] an intensified role of adversarial advocacy frequently
leading to drawn out overcomplicated proceedings ; and the increase
of “entrepreneurial ‘expert witnesses who bring to legal
proceedings limited experience , or exposure at, the rock face of
contemporary professional engineering practice. The result
over recent years has been a significant increase in the duration
and cost of engineering litigation, significant increase in the
concerns expressed in the engineering industry and profession about
varying standards of expert testimony on engineering issues, and
most importantly, when these issue are the subject of deal debate,
the outcomes much more unpredictable”. The unpredictability is the
difference between the ‘prospective’ view that the engineer must
take of any new task and its outcomes and inherent risks, and the
‘retrospective’ view that can be taken in expert testimony of
exactly the same task and outcomes and risks after the event – with
the advantage of knowing what actually happened……………….It may not be
a perfect view, but the view formed in prospect – before the actual
task gets under way – is nonetheless that of the responsible and
competent professional engineer making effective use of the
contemporary bank of engineering knowledge and
experience……………………….there is a ‘missing link’.[2]
The above passage raises a great many poignant points.
Adversarialism is indeed on the “up and up”. It is not likely
to abate because we have an adversarial heritage; the only glimmer
of hope on the horizon is that mediation is becoming far more
popular once legal proceedings have been issued. Mediation
however will not arrest the initiation of legal proceedings; rather
it may serve to conclude proceedings at an earlier juncture than
would otherwise be the case. Reason being when a letter of
demand is issued, in the case of insured defendants it has to be
dispatched to the insurer. Insurers do not often negotiate
prior to the initiation of legal proceedings. Some may
consider this to be disingenuous. Not really, as
insures know that some letters of demand may only be speculative
and unlikely to culminate in legal proceedings.
The comments about “prospective views” rather than
“retrospective views” are insightfully correct. The judgement
calls that are made at the time a decision is made with respect to
a particular fire engineering scenario will be based upon prudent
thought, the application of current if not best practice fire
engineering intelligence, consideration of the relevant facts at
hand along with the factoring in of certain calculated
assumptions. In due course if there is a calamity and it is
analysed and judged in retrospect there is every chance that
different expert evaluators will have a “different take” on
matters. Ironically the retrospective analyses of the expert
in a post calamity scenario are artificial and to some extent
contrived. This is because “after the event” reconstruction
modelling can never be totally accurate or diagnostically
conclusive, because it involves a reconstruction of the events, the
facts and certain scenarios in circumstances where relevant
evidence may have literally vaporised. Much reliance will
then be afforded to recollection, to finding out under cross
examination why a person approached an engineering solution the way
he or she did, what calculations were factored into the fire
modelling, what were the fire scenarios that were contemplated and
so forth. If per chance the fire occurred, say seven years
previously, then it is not inconceivable that important evidentiary
documentation that formed the basis of judgement had
disappeared.
As stated in the above quoted material there are indeed “varying
standards of expert testimony”. The variance can be due to
respective sizes of the hip pockets. A large hip pocket can afford
a top expert and a more limited budget will compel one to engage a
lesser light. Just like the legal profession has a graduated
scale of legal experts ranging from junior barrister, to senior
junior to Queens’ Counsel there are technical experts that enjoy a
preeminent reputation and there are “Jonny Come Latelys” who have a
tendency to underwhelm.
But it is not the variance in seniority and juniority that is
the greatest cause for variance; rather it is the fact that the
experts have a remarkable propensity in litigation matters to not
agree. In 25 years of practice, having had conduct or
involvement with thousands of cases, I cannot recall one case where
the experts have agreed on the diagnosis and the costs.
Sometimes the variance in term of opinion simply beggars
belief. I recall one matter recently where one side stated
that the cost of rectification would be $30,000.00 and the other
side said $1,200,000.00. The lower sum I might add was closer
to the mark. There is a culture where experts are loathe to
arrive at a diagnosis that is objectively "un tainted" by the
intrusive shadow of the fee paying client. One side will be
trying to make a “silk purse out of a sows ear” and the other side
will say that it’s simply a “sows ear”, when in fact the truth may
be somewhere in the middle and the much vaunted ear may simply be a
“polyester, wool combination ear”.
At the time of finishing this paper I had a meeting with a new
client and had the good fortune of reading an expert’s diagnosis on
a waterproofing issue. The most common word that the expert
used was “may”; it “may” be because, yet it “may” also be because
of such and such”. At the end of the report the expert
concluded that it would be a good idea to get some additional
expertise because his particular area of expertise was not really
commensurate with the intricacies of matters at hand. Where
the expert did show unequivocal enthusiasm and a very robust
disposition was the size of the bill and the bill did not use the
word may when it talked about payment terms. So when the
Warren Centre is rueing the varying standard of expert witness
competence they are sadly not exaggerating.
Performance Regulation and Fire Engineering
With the advent of the performance based building code in
Australia in the mid ninety’s the country moved away from
predominantly prescriptive regulation to performance based building
control. Performance regulation troubled a great many prominent
fire engineers and I recall addressing a conference with the
well-known fire engineer Dr John Hall from the USA. Dr Hall made
somewhat of an ominous yet accurate prognosis and observation when
he stated that property developers when they look for a performance
solution are rarely ever motivated by increasing the benchmarks of
public safety. Rather they are more motivated by determining the
cheapest way to build. With the coupling of private certification
in Australia in the early nineties and the convergence of a more
flexible building code there occurred a paradigm shift in building
control. There was a rapid metamorphosis from a prescriptive
building control dynamic to a more discretion based building
control regime courtesy of the discretion that was afforded to
building surveyors to sanction alternative solutions. This
did not appear to bode well for regulatory control.
Much to the surprise of many of the critics of both the
performance based BCA and the coupling up of the private
certification system there has been no notable calamity that has
been caused by said juxtaposition. This is indeed fortunate and
maybe more as a result of good luck than design; although there are
some that say the jury is still out. As to whether the
“purple patch” will continue, only time will tell.
Certainly the case in NZ has been far more miserable, the
flexibility that was afforded by the NZ Building Code, a code that
was heralded in the mid-nineties as being world’s best practise,
proved in the fullness of time to very problematic. The
flexibilities within the code were such that a very liberal
approach was taken to installation of fabric and material.
The culmination was the leaky building debacle, which resulted in
the establishment of an Act of Parliament and a tribunal dedicated
to dealing with the leaky building maelstrom. At last count
it is predicted that by the time all claims are resolved there may
be as much as 25 billion dollars’ worth of economic downside
associated with the reconstruction of woefully compromised
buildings. For NZ that is a calamity as the economy does not
have the capacity to easily digest that sort of impact.
Back onto home shores, the author of this paper nevertheless has
always been nervous about a highly flexible performance based
building code that is applied in a discretion based/subjective
building control decision making environment when there is a
particular application to fire engineering. The concern is
heightened when active, rather than passive fire resistant
proposals are sanctioned. The later approach tends to rely
more upon alternative solutions and there is a contemplation that
is implicit in the assumptions that human beings will be relied
upon to have an active input into the maintenance of the fire
mitigation regime. If someone responsible for maintaining an
aspect of a fire retardant system goes “MIA” (missing in action)
then unintended consequences may emerge.
The flexibilities that have emanated from the performance system
seem to resonate with the negative inklings of Dr Hall, where he
states that alternative solutions are rarely used to increase the
benchmarks of public safety. The author has had firsthand
experience in cases where alternatives to
fire sprinkler systems have invariably been cheaper than
sprinkler systems and those systems have been found wanting.
Alternative solutions lend themselves to a more imaginative or
creative approach to fire engineering. It follows that there will
be greater regard to fire engineering modelling and less reliance
upon prescriptive measures and well established verification
methods. Expert appraisal and expert thinking thus becomes
paramount. So the appraisal better be “damn good”.
As sure as day follows night when there is retrospective
analysis of fire modelling that is applied to a scenario where the
modelling is brought into question, it will be very easy to find a
chorus of experts, some of whom may be hired guns, who will be able
to stridently criticise and attack the fire modelling assumptions
that underpinned the alternative solution.
And here belies the problem and the higher than normal risk
profile for the fire engineering profession. If a defendant cannot
fall back upon a prescriptive deemed to satisfy provision but is
reliant upon fire modelling and associated assumptions, and I
emphasise assumptions, that formed the basis of that which is
sanctioned by fire engineering experts, then the rationale for the
decision will be susceptible to conflicting opinion and expert
attack. The experts briefed to dissect all of the ingredients that
characterise the assumptions underpinning the modelling will be
able to indulge themselves knowing that they are paid handsomely by
the hour and are afforded a fair bit of time to form a view. On
balance the blending of a plaintiff who has been the victim of a
fire engineering failure complemented with the ingredients of hired
gun intent on professionally shaming the hapless engineer will,
from the defendant’s point of view, generate a toxic cocktail.
Compare this with a defendant being able to say that the fire
engineering solutions were based upon recognised deemed to satisfy
provisions or very well recognised verification methods in
circumstances where a reputable expert can confirm that such
compliance did occur and one has a very robust and confident
defence. Alternative solutions require discretion and a high level
of subjectivity; they are thus pretty easy to attack whereas DTS
compliance is not.
Risk management
Where performance standards are applied and there is an election
to resort to alternative solutions, there need to be some belts and
braces. The fire engineering concern needs to have either
internal or expert peer review so that some of the fire modelling
assumptions are tested. Fire engineering is not really a
discipline that lends itself to the sole practitioner paradigm as
internal peer review seems to be a critical part of enlightened
fire modelling
Ensure that a fire engineered alternative solution is not driven
by cost cutting as the paramount maxim. Fire causes the
greatest potential for menace it is not an area that lends itself
to cheapskates. Don’t accept briefs where the remuneration
does not provide a sufficient level of remuneration to get the job
done properly.
Choose one`s clients carefully, the combination of a client who
displays a parsimonious approach to payment but equally an
enthusiasm for imaginative alternative solutions is a fraught with
risk.
In economic times if work is harder to find, don’t compromise by
engaging in fee cannibalisation. The building surveying
profession does too much of this and in doing so lowers the charge
out rate floor. As an aside 10 years ago I used to do a lot of
prosecution work for councils, other law firms began to cannibalise
rates and it got to the point where I refused to drop my rates so I
changed direction and largely vacated the prosecution arena.
The market dictated that too little was being charged for too much
risk. Conveyancing likewise 20 years ago was a lucrative area
of practice for lawyers, until fee cannibalisation began. It
would now cost less to do a conveyance than it did 10 years
ago. Little wonder that conveyancers are regularly on the
receiving end of law suits. The price they charge is not
remotely commensurate with the time and precision that is required
for the task. Price has to marry up with risk, if it does not
it will not bode well.
Use well known fire engineering verification methods when it
comes round to fire modelling. Fire engineering is the last
place to “push the envelope”, the last place to try something novel
and new. Even in the alternative solution paradigm apply
conservatism.
[1] The Warren
Centre for Advanced Engineering Limited, “Professional Performance,
Innovation and Risk in Australian Engineering Practice” The
Warren Centre for Advanced Engineering Limited, Sydney University
NSW 2006 Australia.
[2] The Warren
Centre for Advanced Engineering Limited, “Professional Performance,
Innovation and Risk in Australian Engineering Practice” The
Warren Centre for Advanced Engineering Limited, Sydney University
NSW 2006 Australia.
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